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Interactive expertise in solo and joint
musical performance
Abstract
The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians – a classical string quartet and a solo, free
improvisation saxophonist – to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of
expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of
prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of
entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then
turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts of cognition. Attempting to
strengthen and extend them, we offer ‘Arch’: an overarching conception of musical interaction as an
externalized, cognitive scaffold that encompasses high and low-level cognition, internal and external
processes, as well as the shared normative space including the musical materials in which the musicians
perform. In other words, ‘Arch’ proposes interaction as a multivariate multimodal overarching scaffold
necessary to explain not only cases of joint performance, but equally of solo improvisation.
Keywords: Musicianship; Expertise; Mesh; Joint Action; Interaction as Scaffold; Phenomenological
Interviews.

1)Introduction
This paper presents two case studies of expert musicianship, one of joint performance and one of solo
performance, to defend two claims. Focusing on the first case study, the first claim is that we can
conceive of such expertise as an interactional skill, in which interaction itself, considered as an
externalized, extended, and scaffolded cognitive system, constitutes a singular overarching structure
enveloping both low level and high level cognitive capacities. Our second claim and more radical claim,
is that musical expertise even in the case of solo performance can be understood as an interactional
skill, in which one enacts several agential poles in order to achieve a successful solo improvisation.
The literature on “expertise” as well as that on the nature of joint action in social ontology seems to be
analogously divided into accounts that stress low-level, unconscious or, automatic self-regulatory
mechanisms, versus accounts that stress high-level metacognitive and planning skills. In the expertise
debate, we find a dichotomy between the “mindlessness” or “automaticity” accounts of Dreyfus and
others (Dreyfus 2005; Beilock & Carr 2001). They claim that reflection degrades coping (Dreyfus 2005;
2013), and that self-reflection or attention to one’s own body interferes with the automaticity or
proceduralization that defines expertise (Beilock &Carr 2001; Beilock 2011). On the opposite side, other
authors stress that expertise is pervasively characterized by deliberation, planning and reflection

(Montero 2016). In social ontology, high-level accounts stress the necessity of mind-reading capacities,
common knowledge or theory-building in order to understand others when acting together with them
(Bratman 1992, Tomasello 2014), while others claim that minimal bodily and brain-based processes of
mirroring and entrainment suffice for our engagement with others (Butterfill 2012; 2013 Knoblich,
Günther et al. (2011). In both domains, accounts attempting to integrate the two poles are emerging. In
social ontology, a number of proposals have stressed the need for a layered account of shared
intentionality that encompasses intermediate levels of cognitive complexity or jointness (e.g. Schmitz
2016 , Ludwig 2016 and Satne 2019). In the expertise domain, Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain have
suggested a “Meshed” model that integrates the domains of the high-level, reflective and
representational with the reflex-like, quick and bodily (Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain 2016). While
we align ourselves with these strategies that have tried to combine or take into account both low-level
and high-level cognitive mechanisms both in the domain of expertise and joint action, we find some
vagueness in Christensen, Sutton et al’s proposal pertaining to the exact nature of the “integration” of
levels it offers. Further, the model does not (yet) treat the explanatory potential of cognitively
scaffolding interaction, and hence our focus intends to develop and expand the explanatory reach of
“Mesh” and provide a more encompassing view that incorporates individual processes, shared
strategies and external materials into a single overarching structure of interaction, thus we label this
conception “Arch” rather than “Mesh”. Our focus on interaction is also in line with the enactivist or
“interactionist” trend in philosophy of mind (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo &
Gallagher 2010). This position shares the focus on the sufficiency of minimal coordination with Butterfill
et al’s proposal just mentioned and stresses mutual adaptation and mutual tracking when accounting
for interaction. Their claim is more radical though, stating that “there is no cognition without
interaction” and that “interactive processes […] can complement and even replace individual
mechanisms” (De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher 2010, 441). In other words, interactionism claims that
the processes constituting cognition are themselves interactive. This paradigm has provided important
evidence that spontaneous coordination unfolds in stable patterns among agents in interaction and
describes these interactive processes as unique dynamical systems themselves constituted by
autonomous systems in interaction (ibid). We find, however, that the exclusive focus on very basic forms
of interaction and their constitution in a dynamical system leaves it open and unclear how to scale up
and include more sophisticated mental acts of self-reflection and planning for instance.
Our account is based on two case studies, in the form of qualitative, “phenomenological” interviews
(Høffding & Martiny 2016) with a string quartet and with an improvising saxophonist (Høffding 2019;
Høffding & Schiavio 2019). Linking these interviews to the two aforementioned theoretical domains,
those of expertise and joint action, we first explore the kind of expertise that goes into performing
together as a tightly knit group, thus expanding the expertise theories that so far mostly has focused on
individual action. Second, turning to the case of solo jazz improvisation, we show how this is an
inherently interactive process in which one must enact several external agential poles in order to
achieve a successful solo improvisation. Both cases bear on incredibly fast processes informed by bodily
non-propositional knowledge as well as on sophisticated mental actions of seeing and hearing oneself
from external perspectives, planning into the future and drawing on musical references. We believe that
a scaffolded structure of interaction can most parsimoniously account for these complex musical

actions. In other words, we take interaction to work as an overarching structure that smoothens and
facilitates the musical unfolding for both the string quartet and the solo sax player. Hence, we propose
interactionism not as a position “in between” the reflective, top-down and the bodily, bottom-up
accounts, but as a framework that encompasses both and in a single account can span both poles
without needing recourse to an additional explanatory link between two levels.

2) The expertise debate
The so-called expertise debate is largely about whether thinking interferes with acting. A number of
philosophers hold and have held the belief that it does, also voiced in sports psychology as the advice
that expert athletes and artists ought to avoid thinking too much about the actions they are about to
perform (Beillock & Carr 2001; Beilock 2011). This will degrade the fluency of their actions (Dreyfus
2005; 2013) or even lead to a complete breakdown of the action also known as “choking” (see Cappucio
2015). A debated proponent of this position is Hubert Dreyfus, with his five-stage model of expertise
(2014) and his articles concerning the relation between expert coping and reflection (2005; 2013). His
position has been thoroughly discussed for instance by Breivik 2013, Sutton et al. 2011, Fridland 2014,
Dow 2017, Montero 2016, and Høffding 2019, and we will not rehearse further criticism here. A
seemingly parallel line of thinking emerges from so-called “Eastern perspectives”; philosophies of
martial arts systems from China and Japan, where one, while in some form of “flow” or meditative state,
putatively loses self-awareness (Hutto & Ilundáin-Agurruza 2018, Ilundáin-Agurruza 2015, De Prycker
2011).
In her recent book Thought in Action, expertise and the conscious mind, Barbara Montero gives a
detailed overview of these positions and offers poignant analytic retaliation. As a former professional
ballet dancer, she believes that most of the “mindlessness” accounts of expertise mentioned above are
mythical constructions and persistently argues that we tend to underrate the speed of reflection and
that such reflection is instrumental to the development and maintenance of expertise. She also engages
with the Chinese and Japanese intuitions and rather persuasively shows that much of their reception in
“the West” can be traced back to the now classic Zen and the Art of Archery (Herrigel 1989), in which
theoretically central conclusions are drawn from dubious understanding or probable misinterpretations
of a Zen archer master’s words (Montero 2016, Chap. 1). Her positive contribution consists in defending
a claim called “cognition-in-action”:
For experts, when all is going well, optimal or near optimal performance frequently employs
some of the following conscious mental processes: self-reflective thinking, planning,
predicting, deliberation, attention to or monitoring of their actions, conceptualizing their
actions, control, trying, effort, having a sense of the self, and acting for a reason. Moreover,
such mental processes do not necessarily or even generally interfere with expert performance,
and should not generally be avoided by experts. (2016, 38)

Montero gathers all sorts of empirical evidence for her position, generally showing that, indeed, thinking
does not degrade coping and that expertise cannot come about without the abovementioned
cognitively sophisticated mental processes.
This intellectual landscape calls for critical, integrative work. It cannot be that thinking both interferes
with and enables as well as enhances expert coping, not at least without further clarification of how
these different outcomes are possible and why and when they occur.1 Our attempt in this paper is to
point to extended, interactive cognitive and embodied structures that can incorporate cognition-inaction, but also to account for how expert action is sometimes brought about without such high
individual cognitive demands. In this, our proposal is not unlike John Sutton, Wayne Christensen and
colleagues’ endeavor to provide a “Meshed” account of expert action.
In a number of papers, Christensen and Sutton begin to provide the groundwork for an integrated
conception of expert skill (Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain 2015; 2016; Christensen et al. 2015). They
review existing accounts that are categorized – analogously to the above exposition – as “automatic” or
“full cognitive” and suggest Mesh as a hybrid theory. Identifying nine desired expertise explananda,
namely “(i) reduced attention, (ii) multi-task tolerance, (iii) disruptive attention, (iv) reduced cognitive
effort, (v) reduced memory, (vi) strategic focus, (vii) action slip, (viii) increased attention in response to
challenge, (ix) increased cognitive effort in response to challenge” (Christensen, Sutton & McIlwain
2016, 45-6) they show how Mesh, as opposed to for instance “automatic” or “full cognitive” provides
explanans for all nine. Including the earlier “AIR” (Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Geeves et al.
2014; Sutton et al. 2011) work, the authors draw on qualitative interviews with and observations of
expert musicians, mountain bikers and cricket players integrated with empirical work from sports
psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. They conceive of Mesh as a “hybrid view” and propose
“that controlled and automatic processes are closely integrated in skilled action, and that cognitive
control directly influences motor execution in many cases.” (Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain 2016,
43). One way of conceptualizing such a hybridization is to nuance the very notion of “control”. Whereas
in “automatic” and “full cognitive” control is an all-or-nothing matter, they suggest a partition into
“smooth control”, “adaptive control”, and “effortful problem solving” that each shade into one another
(ibid., 52). Such conceptual work helps resolve the dichotomies that haunt the expertise debate and is
compatible with other phenomenologically informed expertise accounts for instance of how musicians
employ different kinds of control functions in musical interaction (Salice, Høffding & Gallagher 2017).
While we generally endorse Mesh, there remains some unclarity to its exact nature: is Mesh a
framework that integrates two other frameworks, or is it in itself is an integrated framework that
envelops, replaces or overrides the others? The term “hybrid” is ambiguous. A hybrid can be a singular
phenomenon that embeds properties of other phenomena into itself, in the way that an okapi could be
conceived of as a hybrid of a zebra and a giraffe. A hybrid, however, can also be a meta-system that
switches between two or more primary systems, in the way a hybrid car switches between running on
gasoline and electricity. In the former case, the hybrid is integrated insofar as there only is one
1

Ellen Fridland makes the same observation, but suggests a path toward resolution that differs from ours, we
discuss this below. See also Fridland 2014; 2017a;2017b.

homeostatic system or organism, namely the okapi. The okapi is not made up of one giraffe-part and
one zebra-part. In the latter case, the hybrid car relies on two separate systems, the electric and the
gasoline system, and is integrated in a different sense of the word, insofar as it uses these two systems
alternately to effectuate locomotion. Applied to the present investigation, the ambiguity here amounts
to conceiving of expertise as either a secondary system that builds links between the primary systems of
top-down and bottom-up, or thinking of it as the construction of a new primary system that is inherently
self-integrated in the homeostatic sense of the word illustrated by the okapi example. We think that
Sutton, Christensen and colleagues, inspired by neuroscientific evidence, conceive of Mesh as integrated
in the former sense, like a hybrid car. Relying more on the phenomenology of experts’ experience, we,
perhaps in contrast, want to remain open to the latter conception and think of interaction as a singular
self-integrating structure that develops together with, or as part of, expertise.
Well aligned with the Mesh proposal, we find Ellen Fridland’s work. In a number of papers, she
convincingly argues against understanding skill through dichotomies such as (propositional) intelligent
vs. (bodily) unintelligent processes (Fridland 2017a) and automaticity vs. control (Fridland 2017b),
showing that trying to integrate such dichotomized concepts fails to explain the empirical literature on
the psychology of skill. Though introducing a layered view of different kinds of control (Fridland 2014),
her account mostly remains a negative contribution, highlighting the problems in Dreyfus’, David
Papineau’s and Jason Stanley’s dichotomizations. She acknowledges that her account must face up to
the “interface problem”, namely the problem of how to relate the intermediate levels of cognition
between the brute bodily, and the sophisticated propositional (Fridland 2017b, 1557)2. Opposed to
Mesh, Fridland remains individualistic, as she does not (yet) address the cognitive potential of
interactive and scaffolded resources, which we believe should be used in overcoming the interface
problem.3 When we from now on home in on these resources in an attempt to expand the Mesh model,
we believe that this spills over to Fridland’s postion. Hence, from here on we frame our analysis as a
response to Mesh.
In a forthcoming follow-up to the recent Mesh publications, Sutton and Christensen claim allegiance to
anti-individualism and anti-internalism (Christensen and Sutton, forthcoming). They further claim that
cognition is structured for the demands of interaction and that task control is distributed across body
and world (ibid.). This is a welcome, but slightly surprising development. Surprising, because the notions
of extended and embodied cognition are not mentioned in the theory building Mesh papers from 2015
and 2016. We are curious to know how Mesh conceives of the role of interaction as cognitively
foundational in their hybrid model. Our positive contribution based on expert musicians both backs and
extends the reach of the Mesh. Methodically it is certainly compatible, emphasizing “cognition in the
wild” (Christensen and Sutton, forthcoming) over and above lab-experiments that often fall short on
ecological validity (Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain 2015)

2 The “interface problem” was first presented in Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2014; see also Mylopoulos & Pacherie
2017).
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While spelling out in detail how “Arch” specifically overcomes the interface problem, is not something we purport
to be doing here, but must be left for another paper, below we do provide the key reasons why “Arch” does not
prima facie confront an “interface problem” between high and low level cognition.

We recognize that we are not the first to turn to interaction as a framework for music performance.
Enactivism primarily of the kind heralded by Gallagher, De Jaegher, and Di Paolo (cfr. De Jaegher, Di
Paolo and Gallagher 2010, Gallagher 2017) has become popular in music studies of philosophical
(Krueger 2009; 2014) and psychological nature (Schiavio and Cummins 2015; Schiavio et al. 2017;
Schiavio & De Jaegher 2017).4 In a chapter on music and empathy in the context of interactionism, van
der Schyff and Krueger provide a comprehensive overview of publications in the emerging field of 4E
cognition music studies. In several places mentioning the integration of top-down and bottom-up
processes, they write about emotions that:
they are increasingly explored as dynamic phenomena that span an integrated brain-body-world
system. Importantly, this research highlights the active and self-organizing nature of emotional
experience as it develops across bodily, neural, ecological and temporal dimensions. (van der
Schyff & Krueger, forthcoming)
Here, “integration” is used in the aforementioned “homeostatic” sense of the word, as “selforganizing”.5 What van der Schyff and Krueger attempt to do for empathy in emotion, namely develop it
along 4E cognition lines, with a focus on interaction, we now suggest to do for expertise.

3) Case I: How do you play together?
The Danish String Quartet (DSQ) is a Danish chamber music ensemble consisting of Frederik Øland
(violin), Rune Tonsgaard (violin), Asbjørn Nørgaard (viola), and Fredrik Sjölin (cello). They began playing
together in their teenage years and have risen to international fame for their intense performances of
most of the classical string quartet repertoire as well as their Nordic folk music. As most professional
classic musicians today, they all started practicing before turning eight and have since practiced on
average for several hours most days ever since (as of 2018, they are between 34 and 37 years old). It is
difficult to know precisely how many hours, thirty such years of practice amounts to, but a good
estimate lies between 20-30.000 hours at least half of which they have practiced and performed
together. Coming across a group of four people who have used well over 10.000 hours painstakingly
perfecting the smallest of details in a collaboration as complex and intricate as a string quartet, provides
a unique chance to study processes of shared intentionality. In fact, no words or theories can scale up to
the experience of seeing such an ensemble perform, but thorough phenomenological interviews can
give a decent insight into the minds and bodies working in such an ensemble.
The following data is based on several years of investigations and interviews together with the DSQ
amounting to about 17 interview hours. The theory, methodology and pragmatics behind combining a
philosophical or phenomenological inquiry with a qualitative interview is comprehensive and beyond
the scope of the present paper. The precise practice is described in Høffding & Martiny 2016 and
4

For work on dance, improvisation and interactionism see Himberg et al 2018; Ravn 2016b.
Another convincing “integrated” account of emotions is found in Michelle Maiese’s work, overcoming the
classical dichotomy contained in the question, “How can emotions be both cognitive and bodily” (Maiese 2014).
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somewhat similar to Petitmengin et al’s method (Petitmengin 2006; Petitmengin & Bitbol 2009), though
closer to standard ethnographic work (Brinkman & Kvale 2014; Denzin et al. 2011) especially as seen in
Ravn’s work (Ravn 2016a; Ravn & Christensen 2014). The interviews fall within the ethnographic
category of the “case study” (Flyvbjerg 2006; 2011), and because the DSQ have such an exceptional,
expert skillset, the data moreover represents an “extreme” or “deviant” case “, which is “particularly
well suited for theory development, because it helps researchers understand the limits of existing
theories and to develop the new concepts, variables, and theories that will be able to account for what
were previously considered outliers.” (Flyvbjerg 2011, 307). In this case, a thorough analysis of the DSQ’s
different forms of musical communication and shared modes of intentionality can put pressure on the
aforementioned expertise models.
The DSQ-members have several different ways of playing together that rely on different conscious and
sub-conscious mechanisms. They have been described in Salice, Høffding & Gallagher 2017 as “motor
resonance”, “explicit coordination”, and “interkinesthetic affectivity”. To briefly summarize each of
these mechanisms, motor resonance is conceived as a sub-conscious process which allows the DSQ
members to trace each other, for instance through entrainment (Pacherie 2012). Such a sub-conscious
process seems to be necessary to explain the instances of playing together in which the musicians are
unaware – and sometimes totally oblivious – of each other, as for instance when engulfed in mindwandering (Smallwood & Schooler 2006). Explicit coordination refers to a situation of uncertainty and
lack of trust in themselves, each other or the performance situation as such, leading the DSQ members
to forcefully impose a compensatory form of cohesion by trying to predict what the others’ will do, by
looking at each other and by giving visual cues. Interkinesthetic affectivity is a shared sense or feeling of
moving together, availing detailed and intimately sensed knowledge of where the ensemble is heading
musically speaking, which does not require prediction or mind-reading. In the following, we wish to
focus on interkinesthetic affectivity because it is what according to the DSQ characterizes their optimal
mode of playing together. Optimal insofar as it is the kind they enjoy the most and in which they report
the highest degree of trust and intimacy, which is of relevance to our interactional agenda.
How can be best explain the interkinesthetic sort of interactions that DSQ members enjoy when they
play together? What we are looking for within this kind of interaction are explanatorily powerful
causalities. More precisely, we are not satisfied with a general account of how the DSQ-members agree
to play together, a la, sharing the intention or commitment of playing together (cfr. Bratman 1992,
Gilbert 2013). Rather, we want to be able to ascribe a kind of causal story at the micro level, pertaining
to a single tone or melodic line as performed. A high-level, top-down story, would predict that they plan
a precise interpretation of every single note that they stick to, using the score as a kind of memory cue.
This would be supported also by the shared actions of making notations in the score during practice:
once they find a suitable interpretation, they may mark it in the score to help remember a certain
bowing, phrasing or fingering. The difficulty of playing a late Beethoven string quartets would be met
not only with planning, but also with acts of prediction. Because they have played the pieces many times
before, they have very precise predictions of the progress of the pieces, which translate into their
motor-repertoire. In other words, predicting an upcoming difficult passage, they prepare certain handpositions or thought patterns to smoothen the transition into such passages. In the midst of the concert,

however, with its rapid developments, constant adjustments, it might be objected that this kind of highlevel, top-down thinking is just too slow and inflexible and that an embodied reflex-like mental pattern
must be invoked in order to explain the unfolding of the concert. Rather than departing from various
theories, let us look at the evidence from the interviews and then review how to best theorize about it.
The DSQ violist Asbjørn Nørgaard uses the metaphors of a “hive-mind” and a “bubble over everyone’s
heads” that he can somehow directly manipulate through his own actions. However, the hive-mind
metaphor indicates that there is no single individual making the shots, but that it is an emergent and
shared process
It is just such a special feeling, if we perform a concert and there is a movement where it just
clicks, because I’ve playing a lot of computer and sometimes demanded what I call “hivemind”…where you have this feeling that I know, without knowing, I know what Frederik will do
in 3 seconds and then I can do something that matches damn well, and then, I have also talked
about as if it is a bubble.
When you perform in the quartet, you know precisely when to play the tones, you know what
the others are doing without looking at them. When everyone in the quartet is in this state, it
is just like there is a bubble of sound over every ones’ heads that you can just form as you
wish.
When Asbjørn can “know what Frederik will do in three 3 seconds” this looks like a case of top-down
prediction. However, Asbjørn importantly designates this kind of knowledge as a “feeling”, or a knowing
“without knowing”. He is not predicting in the sense that he is making an inference from the current
state of affairs. Rather, the future-directed feeling exists in the communicated bow-movements. He
does not need to look at his co-players, as listening – and more importantly for our case, some form of
music-mediated, bodily coupling – is more prevalent here. As sub-conscious, motor-resonance is
involved in this regulation, but the causally efficient cognition here is the experienced feeling of trust
that guides the unfolding. With regard to explicit coordination, this high-level kind of predictions are to
be thought of as compensatory strategies that are rendered irrelevant once interkinesthetic affectivity is
established. To Rune, the latter is experienced as a heightened and pervasive “trust”. This feeling is
expressive of the scaffolded cognitive resource of an intense intersubjective attunement, in which the
co-players’ movements and one’s own appear on, or almost on, par: “I know what Frederik will do in
three seconds” much in the same way as I know what I myself will do in three seconds.6 Here is another
example from Asbjørn about interkinesthetic affectivity and how it affects the non-individual
determination of musical expression
I can't say, now we should play faster, now we should do this or that. Then, perhaps I can get
everyone to play faster, but then this bubble has collapsed. And then we're again four students
of music playing in parallel lines. But this hive-mind… It is when that one is in place, it is very
6

This form of interkinesthesia has further implications for other debates in social ontology, e.g. what it means to
be a ’we’. A detailed discussion of these intricate debates is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Satne 2019;
Salice, Høffding and & Gallagher 2017.

difficult to affect very much through one's will power....I sounds contradictory, I can see that,
but something is affected and some choices are made, but I just don't know where it comes
from. When we perform these chorals and they change. It might be that it comes from me, but
I have no clue. It emerges so instinctively. I think it is those instinctive things. You can clearly
feel when you're playing, then I can feel when the others' try something. Or when it flows. You
can feel when someone believes something or does something. "Now I believe it is too slow, so
I'll get the tempo back up.” That is a completely different feeling from that organic drive that
does not derive from some concrete thought.
According to Asbjørn, as soon as someone is enforcing a pre-meditated interpretation, rather than
maintaining this kind of bubble mentality, as soon as someone “tries something”, or “believes
something” this is detectable and degrades the community. Choices are made that drive the music forth,
and which results in particular musical changes, for instance in the way they perform certain chorals of
Danish composer Nielsen, slightly differently every time, but no individual is making these choices. And
if they do, they become “students of music playing in parallel lines” that is, without cohesion, without
actually playing together. Instead, the choices develop dynamically as the unfolding of one shared
intention with which they all go along. Here is an ever-developing loop, in which the musicians begin
playing, are drawn along by the music, leading them to engage the music differently, again changing the
music and so on. Nevertheless, there is a sense that you can contribute to this interactive process, that
you can help shape the bubble in a certain way, still on the premises of the interaction. This sense of
musicality is not a reactive, pre-meditated stance. I am not obeying or even following the others. My
agency is intact (or rather it is at the same time restricted by and expanded to the agency of the
collective) and I chose to compliment and have mental freedom to enjoy a sense of how the music is
about to unfold. Such mental processes are sophisticated, full of interpretations, choices, and
preferences, but always on the premise of the artistic coherence of the music and collective. In other
words, even if fast, and “instinctive” as Asbjørn says, the shared musical acts in interkinesthetic
affectivity are not reflex-like, but intelligent, responsive, adaptive, and full of musical sense.7 We will see
the degree of intelligence and musical strategy even more clearly in the next case of free improvisation.

4) Case II: How do you play together – when alone?
One might at first hand think that the score-based, “classical” musician has a higher top-down load than
the improvising jazz musician, as the former is restricted to a score and specific rules of interpretation,
whereas the latter can be “spontaneous” and react on the spot. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Torben Snekkestad, associate professor at the Rhythmic Music Conservatory, Copenhagen, is an expert
jazz “free improvisation” saxophone player, with an extensive touring career and record portfolio.8 He
describes the importance of a well-developed practice of reflection on one’s own technique and mind,
7
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See http://torbensnekkestad.com/ for more information. See also Snekkestad 2016.

as a necessity for producing interesting and original improvisations. Improvising with others is a
“negotiation”
In terms of sound it is merging in and out. Or perhaps do the opposite and be a contrast…how
much is a dialogue, how much two monologues in parallel?...To what degree should it be
independent in such a group? How much should you try to follow each other? To be drawn
along, or argue back and forth, quarrel, caress each other
For instance with a really good drummer, who can align himself very closely with you and then
suddenly create a friction. Suddenly he can stop playing in the moment where it is most
predictable that we’re building to a climax, then he can just stop playing and in that way pull the
rug from underneath your feet
The kind of free improvisation in which Torben specializes has neither score nor any explicit rules about
what is to be played. He often has never before played together with a co-player for a particular
concert, even if he might know them from recordings. This lack of shared knowledge and rules makes it
challenging to perform something interesting, which to some extent changes the purpose of the music
from being mostly about expressing a musical meaning or intention, to being primarily about exploring a
certain form of interaction. Before beginning, he might have a certain technique he wants to explore
and an idea about how he wants to interact with one or more co-players, but as soon as the music
begins, all of that can immediately change based on what the others do. According to Torben, however,
there is an implicit agreement among free improvisation players that it is about “pulling the rug” from
underneath the others’ feet, because this opens a new space of possibilities
I believe that we try to create some obstructions exactly to lose control. Because as you lose
control, then…it is experienced as a gift. Instead of becoming anxious and stumble, then
something happens in that search, in that process of losing control, you experience it as a gift
because “ok, now we have a totally new point of entry…ahh how exciting, let’s engage”
This is a process of artistic research, in which each musician discovers news kinds of sounds, new forms
or new techniques
There is a possibility to work very intensively with some parameters of interaction together with
others…which on the spot generates new ways of regarding yourself as a musician and of
opening the material. You have a set of musical materials that you’ve worked on and you’ve
been nerding with some textures. Now you throw it into a setting where it is lit up and where
more layers of reflection are added. It is acted upon. Again, it is self-developing. At this point
you develop your material. Not alone, but in a setting so you can return and see “ahh, ok, it [the
material] was also capable of this.”
According to Torben, free improvisation is not random spontaneity, it is not what he calls reflexive, but
should be based on systematic practice and exploration, what he calls a “reflective practice”. If merely
reflexive, the music has no structure or intention and the musicians will often end up simply mimicking,
call-responding, or what is known as “Mickey Mousing” the other. What he voices in the above

quotation, is that in order to build a good performance, one must possess a repertoire of extensively
and systematically explored sounds and techniques, which one then brings to the performative table,
where they in the best case can develop new dimensions.9 The metaphor of “pulling the rug” indicates
that free improv is inherently an interactive activity that constitutively relies on the other in order to
unfold. In the “good” performance, the performers lift each other to new heights that could not be
accomplished on one’s own.
What makes Torben particularly interesting in this context, is his extensive practice with solo
improvisation. For if you cannot get others to pull the rug from under your feet, how do you manage to
do that yourself? In other words, is it possible to surprise oneself and thus go beyond one’s own
capacity, and if so what kind of techniques might allow for this? Torben has developed an extensive
repertoire for this. As when playing with others, when alone he needs to “lose control”, and he can do
so on the saxophone by exploiting one of its non-ideomatic capacities, namely playing multiphonics also
known as an “extended technique”.
I usually say that I am actually not playing solo, I am playing a duo. It is me and the sax and we
sometimes work together and sometimes against each other.
Unlike a piano or a guitar, the sax is built to play one sound at the time, but the capacities of its
construction can be transcended by certain very demanding finger- and embouchure-techniques
through which rich series of under and overtones emerge. The multiphones require great strength and
dexterity and are inherently unstable10 and hence when playing them, one cannot predict exactly what
sounds will emerge. Here lies a musical field ripe for exploration in which one can constantly negotiate
the boundary between control and surprise with oneself. When an unexpected sound or expression
emerges, one can then use that for improvisation and through a number of other physical and mental
techniques distort and develop its expression. Examples of these techniques are letting the vibe of the
audience, the room, and the texture of the reed influence one’s play, using memory, imagination and
different forms of listening to give color to one’s tones, or of swaying one’s temporal attention slightly
backwards, to retain a better sense of where one is musically coming from, or slightly forwards, leaning
into future possibilities. All of these techniques can also affect one another, sometimes almost
independently of Torben’s sense of agency, and constitute, together with the multiphonics, an entire
agential system that can pull the rug from underneath Torben’s feet. A proof of the artistically farreaching consequences of such improvisatory explorations, is the fact that he re-invented an
instrument, a “reed-trumpet”11 as a response to his musical imagination and the interactive demands of
his practice.

9

Importantly, it is not infrequent that these joint improvisations do not work out, that the collaboration does not
function, or that the material developed is artistically and aesthetically uninteresting or senseless.
10
The nature of the sax multiphonics can be affected by factors such as room temperature, the precise
construction of the sax, and individual physiological differences of throat, jaw, and mouth.
11
In the sixties, Eddie Harris also invented a reed-trumpet, but Torben’s has an altogether different kind of mouthpiece.

This kind of activity cannot be planned. And again by planning, we are not referring to the general
intention to perform, but to the performative microcosm of planning to play this or that tone. It is
exactly in the transgression of intention and control that the improvisation can take off. Yet, it is also not
reflexive or mono-causally input-output like. It is not merely spontaneous because it builds on a
reflective, extensive practice and a sophisticated awareness of the roles and functions of this repertoire
of physical and mental techniques employed in the service of pulling the rug from under one’s own feet.
Like for the DSQ, though even when on one’s own, it is the premise of the interaction in the
performative system that determines the precise production of this or that note or phrase.

5) Interaction as an overarching structure.
We have now demonstrated the role interaction plays in both joint and solo performance. From here,
we turn to the analytic work of characterizing and analyzing the interactions that constitute skilled
performance, vis-à-vis theories on expertise and joint action.
The first step in doing so is to explain exactly what it means for interaction to be a scaffolded cognitive
resource. We refer to scaffolding here as a process through which cognition is sustained and actively
transformed by extant external structures. This to side with “the scaffolded mind hypothesis” according
to which “human cognitive capacities both depend on and have been transformed by environmental
resources” (Sterelny 2010: 472). Following the central idea behind the claim that minds are scaffolded
and in this sense, extensive, we hold that the limits of the mind are not the limits of the individual
organism and may include part of the environment such as tools, materials and other agents, etc. (Clark
& Chalmers 1998, Dreyfus 1972). In the case of expertise performance, this leads to our central claim
regarding ‘Arch’, namely that we can understand musical expert performance as an overarching
interactive structure that is transformed and sustained by an open-ended range of environmental
resources including materials such as physical artifacts, e.g. sounds, written scripts and scores, as well as
various bodies jointly attuned and the various resources they bring to the ongoing exchange. In this
case, the scaffold is the music understood in its widest sense. This scaffold, analytically considered,
changes the hybrid model we presented earlier from the car-like meta-system to the okapi-like
homeostatic one. The musicians are usually not (besides for when the “system” breaks down and they
have to rely on explicit coordination) in the business of switching between high-level inferential
information-processing and low-level bodily and kinetic knowledge. Rather, while simultaneously
employing several mental and bodily capacities, they participate in one integrated musical system that
regulates the employment of these capacities, as when Torben switches improvisational techniques
depending on his perception of the ambience in the room.
A second step is to understand what kind of joint action is involved in these cases. According to the
standard way of thinking of joint action, there are two paradigmatic kinds of joint action. In one end,
joint actions can be regulated by scripts, norms, rules, instructions, or plans that individuals know how
to perform because they are highly trained in the practice they execute with others. - e.g. an orchestra
playing a symphony, tennis-players dueling, institutional actions like large scale military invasions (Satne

2019, Pacherie 2012, Bratman 1992). In the other end, we have small scale actions executed with others
that involve spontaneous coordination and online tracking of each others’ contributions to the joint goal
- e.g. improvised not expert joint dancing or playing catch (Satne & Salice 2019, Butterfill 2012; 2013; De
Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007, Knoblich et al. 2011). Both of our cases cut across these distinctions. The DSQ’s
musical activity is regulated by a long normatively structured history of interaction, as based on scripts
and instructions agreed upon during practice. Yet, at the same time, as when those chorals of Nielsen
change from time to time, they are coordinating spontaneously not explicitly adhering to any of those
scripts, plans or norms, but letting the music as it is currently and collectively experienced determine the
path to take. On the surface, the DSQ seems mostly rule-following. A phenomenologically more justified
description, however, is that their performance at the micro-level unfolds in the way it does due to all
those rules and regulations working as scaffolds of the interaction. A good example hereof is when
Frederik Øland reports hardly ever worrying about remembering how to play the pieces in the expansive
repertoire: “once you start playing, it gives itself”. Here again, knowledge and memory are scaffolded
into the interaction and the performed music becomes a material repository of an extended, shared
mind.
In contradistinction, for Torben, the interaction is premised on being unstructured and unplanned, as
based on spontaneous coordination and tracking. Nevertheless, if he finds the music to be too random,
or inversely, too structured and repetitive, he employs his repertoire of mental and physical techniques
and takes personal hold of a new direction to push the music elsewhere. Again, on the surface level,
there is spontaneous interaction. At the micro-level, however, this interaction, especially when not
successful, is supported by a number of internalized scripts to which Torben has recourse. In addition to
the layer of apparent interaction between the improvising musicians, a second layer of interaction exists
between the unfolding music and Torben’s internal repertoire, likewise guiding the performance.
Moreover, in his solo-improvisation, this first layer of seemingly spontaneous interaction is unavailable
and he has to produce it and enact it himself. In this case, he begins with the rehearsed and regulated
techniques, but pushes them beyond his control such that they extend to take on the cognitive function
of a kind of spontaneous interaction that in turn, scaffolds his new contributions to the improvised
musical performance.
Thus, how should we characterize the rich interactions at stake in these cases of expert musical
performance? We propose to think of them not with the model of joint action that emphasizes joint
plans and common knowledge (Bratman 1992, Tomasello 2014) or joint commitments (Gilbert 2013).
These theoretical models make resource to planning, mental theorizing and/or explicitly conveying ones
will or intentions to perform certain actions of the kind we saw in the examples of expert musicianship
that are not always present in joint musical performance, and when they are, sometimes hinder the
quality of the joint performance. Remember how Asbjørn regards the explicit “thinking something” or
wishing to express something willfully, degrades the DSQ community to one of musical students playing
in parallel. To the DSQ, willful expression and explicit coordination results from musical failure or
insecurity and prevents the natural musical flow that runs best through process of interkinesthetic
affectivity. These theoretical models of joint action seem to commit one to overly intellectualized

accounts of the cognitive mechanisms involved in joint activity and underscore only some aspect of the
rich, multivaried and multimodal interactions described above (Satne 2019; Zahavi & Satne 2015).
We are also not convinced that the model of minimal coordination proposed by Butterfill and others
(Butterfill 2012; 2013; Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2014; Knoblich, et al. 2011), can do justice to the integration
of low-level and high-level cognitive mechanisms involved. The ‘minimalist program’ (Knoblich et al.
2011, Butterfill 2012, Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2014) pursues a non-cognitively-demanding conception of
joint action that can serve as a platform for the development and evolution of sophisticated human
cognitive capacities (cf. Butterfill 2012).The view proposes to model basic joint activities as an overlap of
individual goals pursued by the participant agents. While this can be useful for understanding certain
aspects of joint musical performance, it seems too minimal to be suited to address the complex
integrated capacities, skills and strategies both solo and joint that musicians report to use when playing
together.
As mentioned in the outset of the paper, the focus on minimal coordination is shared with the ‘sensemaking paradigm’ (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher 2010). As the
following example shows, neither of them can easily be made to accommodate our phenomenological
reports describing joint and solo expert musical performance. They may both be compatible with the
DSQ experience of interkinesthetic affectivity, where the members’ communication is constituted by an
affective, bodily and kinesthetic sense, a kind of joint body-schema (Soliman & Glenberg 2014). The
DSQ, however, also employs more sophisticated, meta level, communicative strategies that we have not
referred to in this paper (for an expanded description see Høffding 2019, chap. 11)- which in Torben’s
case is even more clear. How does the sense-making paradigm scale up to the kind of situation, in which
Torben judges that the interaction is too stale and decides to throw some gravel in the machinery?
Imagine a case where he looks for a way to ‘pull the rug’ from the pianists feet, deciding to make a
surprising shift in tonality and tempo, with a musical reference to Charlie Parker, mixed with a
multiphonic, played in that particular way that reminds him of his childhood diving in the Norwegian
archipelago, while simultaneously musically commenting on the guy in the audience who just dropped
his beer. Here is a single musical action that in one sweep executes mental functions of coy pretense
(pulling the rug), normative reference (Charlie Parker), episodic memory (childhood diving), imagination
(the sense of being submerged in water), planning (deciding how to go into the multiphone) as well as a
humorous grasp of and response to a social situation (spilling the beer).
The challenge to the sense-making paradigm also obtains in the expertise debate. How would the
mindlessness or automaticity accounts explain the presence of all these heavy cognitive actions? And
inversely, how would the “cognition-in-action” paradigm do it, all the while also covering the DSQ cases
of interkinesthetic affectivity?
‘Arch’ proposes to describe the musical interactions mentioned as cases of joint activity led by the
musicians’ shared embodied, situational and sometimes even intellectual, understanding of why and
how to do what they are doing. We further claim that from minimal to complex, this shared
understanding can be based on different psychological mechanisms, including bodily coordination,
attunement to others’ feelings and emotions, knowledge of shared norms and instructions, and sharing

reasons on why and how to act, which can be combined in various ways in the unfolding of these
activities. According to this conception, joint intentional activities are distinguished from a mere
aggregation of individual acts by an overarching normative structure of appropriately related individual
participations that has normative significance for the way in which each participant carries out her
actions. Individuals are conjoined in an intentional action of this kind when they share an understanding
of the activity they perform together. This means that they have shared practical understanding of the
purpose of their actions and the means to attain the goal together. This understanding can be obtained
in online interactions, can be inherited form previous interactions, or can be scaffolded by shared
norms, scripts and scores, and other environmental materials and tools, or all of these together and
combined in various ways. Here again, by “understanding” we mean an embodied, as well as situated
understanding, that many times is also intellectually informed. The subject of these intentional
activities is not an individual that coordinates with others, but rather a plural subject, a we, a “hivemind”, that subsumes the different individuals involved in the action as well as the agential pull of the
music as performed that scaffolds the activities of the group.
Shared intentionality so understood is associated with a minimal understanding of others’ mentality and
agency. What is characteristic of these forms of interaction is that each participant’s role in the activity
is determined and structured by the shared activity in which they are taking part, without the
participants necessarily planning ahead or intellectually predicting and representing the mental states of
their partners. Nevertheless, this activity is also scaffolded by shared cultural norms and past practices,
and by the exercise of guided and individual practical reasoning, that together make it possible for more
sophisticated reason-guided and complex skilful collective behaviour to emerge and be sustained. The
individuals in the cases under analysis move back and forth within this overall structure of joint activity,
relying on different mechanisms, intellectual, situationally and embodied, some of which are extended
and environmental, to create more complex and interesting forms of engagement and musical
performance.
‘Mesh’ as a hybrid has done a good job demonstrating some of the exact ways in which the embodied
low-level cognitions match up with the high-level sophisticated ones. In this paper, we do not yet aspire
to the same level of explanatory detail. Instead we propose that the notion of interaction presented at
the core of ‘Arch’, on the one hand, can begin to compensate for too one sided approaches to both
expertise and joint action that emphasise alternatively low-level or high-level cognitive mechanisms, and
on the other hand, can complement and expand the interaction-based accounts and the intermediate
Mesh strategy. The intermediate account, if indeed Mesh is such an account, might seem like a tempting
option, but it carries with it the problem of how to connects the relata of the high-level and the lowlevel. The account of interactive expertise proposed here, endorsing Mesh’s anti-individualist and antiinternalist tenets, provides a multi-layered approach to solo and joint activity in expert musical
performance that provides the right starting point to device how the connection or interface problem
could be overcome. ‘Arch’ claims that cognitive processes both high and low, are integrated from the
outset in an over-arching system that is given and sustained by an ongoing interaction between agents
and environmental structures entrenched in it. The shift from the hybrid car model to the okapi model
explained above can help clarify why ‘Arch’ does not face an interface problem in the way as both

‘Mesh’ and Fridland’s proposals do. As we explained above, while the ‘hybrid car’ model relies on two
separate systems, the electric and the gasoline system, and it can be thought to be integrated insofar as
it uses these two systems alternately to effectuate locomotion, the okapi is not made up of one giraffepart and one zebra-part. The okapi is integrated in the homeostatic sense of being a singular
phenomenon that embeds other phenomena into a new structure that is not one nor the other, not the
mere summation or alternation of the two. We propose to think of interaction as such an overarching
structure constituted by the interplay between high and low level cognitive resources, internal and
external elements, as well as both individual and collective states and interwoven participations.
While a detailed analytical treatment of the interface problem exceeds the ambitions of this paper, the
case made here is sufficient for providing an overlook of how ‘Arch’ by emphasising the role of
interaction as an overarching structure, proposes to address the question of how intermediate levels of
cognition do interface between brute bodily and sophisticated propositional cognitive processes.
According to ‘Arch’ these different cognitive processes are distributed in external scaffolds and
integrated through the interactive activity of collective agents. Musical materials such as instruments,
sounds and scores as well as other players can constitute agentive poles in which different parts and
aspects of the cognitive processes are distributed. All of this constitutes an overarching structure, which
is not only exhibited in cases of group performance like that of the DSQ, but also in solo improvisation
when individuals exploit it to create innovative ways of performing.
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